Abstract: A number of toll roads delivered via PPPs have encountered financial distress due to 12 revenue risk with traffic levels significantly lower than those forecasts in recent years. As a result, 13 there has been a shift in PPP road procurements to models in which the government retains some or 14 all of the demand risk for the project, instead of the concessionaire. A tangible framework to guide 15 governments' decisions in choosing among financial support mechanisms in allocating revenue 16 risks is thus a relevant development for policymakers. This paper proposes a framework to 17 evaluate fiscal support alternatives by comparing the marginal leverage they enable a project to 18 take and the level of financial exposure they allocate to the procuring government. A quantitative 19 methodology is developed that defines inputs and measurable indicators, and also incorporates 20 stochastic modeling and simulation techniques designed for use at an early stage of project 21 planning. The results of a numerical case study demonstrate that flexible term procurement does 22 little to increase project leverage, minimum revenue guarantee is most applicable to projects with 23 significant revenue volatility, while availability payment procurement is more applicable to 24 projects that are projected to have a lower volatility and lower mean revenue relative to their 25 capital investment. 26
Introduction 29
As an alternative approach to traditional public procurement, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 30 have been increasingly adopted by governments globally to procure infrastructure based on the 31 complete life-cycle costs of developing and maintaining the asset, and to transfer the risks 32 associated with complex infrastructure project development and operation to the private sector. 33 maximum payment to government, help to eliminate bias towards selecting firms with optimistic 163 demand forecasts, and help to select the most cost-efficient firm. They claim that contingent 164 concession length is a critical factor of an optimal demand risk-sharing contract. Feng, Zhang et al. 165
(2015) build a bidding model with stochastic traffic demand, assuming that private investors 166 determine toll charges, road quality, and road capacity to maximize profit. By comparing the 167 outcomes between contracts with and without government guarantees, they demonstrate that high 168
MRGs increase toll charges while decreasing road quality and road capacity. 169
Real option based evaluation 170
Other researchers have made efforts to develop quantitative evaluation methods from a financial 171 perspective. The widely used traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method to evaluate 172 engineering projects works well for short-term projects in stable markets. However, for long-term 173 and uncertain projects, the expected cash flow cannot adequately reflect market fluctuations and 174 managerial flexibility, and thus may lead to poor investment decisions (Martins, Marques et al. 175 2015) . In order to remedy this defect and take flexibility into consideration, Myers (1977) derives 176 a Real Options valuation approach from the concept of options in corporate finance. 177
Other studies have proposed tools to evaluate government supports as a bundle of real options 178 and argue that government guarantees will increase investment value, though this is not accounted 183 for in a DCF model. Huang and Chou (2006) demonstrate that an MRG can create substantial 184 value when modeled using real options, assuming operating revenue is a stochastic variable 185 following a generalized Wiener process. Cheah and Liu (2006) adopt a risk-neutral pricing method 186 to value governmental supports as real options, and propose to incorporate the value of such 187 supports into negotiation frameworks. Instead of structuring MRG as a series of European put 188 options (that can only be exercised at the end of its life), Chiara, Garvin et al. (2007) 
propose a 189
Bermudan or a simple multiple-exercise real option model, which can be exercised on 190 predetermined dates between the purchase date and the expiration date. They also employ a 191 multiple-least squares Monte Carlo technique to value the more flexible MRG. Brandao and 192 Saraiva (2008) extend the standard option pricing model to value minimum traffic guarantees by 193 using market data of project returns to estimate stochastic project parameters, and propose to put a 194 cap on total government outlays of guarantees to limit budgetary impacts of contingent liability. Scholars have also applied the real option based models to measure the fiscal burden incurred by 199 taxpayers from government guarantees. Indicators frequently used include 1) the expected present 200 value of all guarantee payments, or the expected amount to be paid each year; 2) the probability 201 distributions of the amount of MRG to be paid, the excess payment with a certain confidence 202 interval, the exceedance probability, or the probability of a budget shortfall under a certain budget; 203 and 3) the probability distributions of the timing and number of times when the MRG may be 204 Wibowo and Kochendoerfer (2010) also develop a framework to quantify the contingent liability 206 of government guarantees, which allows the government to examine relationships among the 207 expected total payment, budget-at-risk allocated, and a desired confidence interval of actual 208 payment not exceeding the budget-at-risk. 209
Empirical studies 210
Despite the common conclusion drawn from theoretical studies that government financial support 211 creates value, some empirical studies show that these revenue risk sharing mechanisms are not as 212 effective as expected. Vassallo (2006) conducted interviews with government agencies, 213 concessionaires and university professors to find that the flexible-term with LPVR mechanism 214 applied in Chile initially met strong opposition from concessionaires for a variety of reasons: (1) 215 the mechanism does not improve the project's ability to fulfill its commitments to lenders; (2) the 216 variable length of the contract makes the concession operation (resource planning) difficult to 217 organize in advance; and (3) the flexible-term procurement limits upside opportunity while not 218 always limiting downside risk. That study did, however, conclude that the LPVR procurement 219 mechanism was effective in reducing renegotiation expectations in Chile. into PPP projects should be limited to the extent needed to attract financing and promote a 264 successful procurement. They establish a conceptual two-dimensional framework to locate the 265 spectrum of possibilities for government financial support, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In this 266 framework, the higher the impact on ability to raise financing and the lower the government's 267 financial exposure the better. The framework is cited and recommended by several subsequent 268 studies (Charoenpornpattana, Minato et al. 2002) and public reports (World Bank Group 2016) . 269 However, a model to incorporate measurable variables to plot mechanisms along those two 270 abstract dimensions is beyond the scope of these existing studies. There is a research gap to go a 271 step further to elaborate the framework into a tangible and measurable model. 
Definition of measurable indicators 275
The proposed model quantifies the implications of various options for revenue risk sharing 276 mechanisms along two dimensions: The impact of the support mechanism on the cost of capital 277 for the project, and risk exposure of the government. 278
Impact on cost of capital 279
Governments offer financial support to projects with revenue risk to make projects bankable and 280 reduce the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for the project. Project WACC is determined 281 by the costs and weights of both equity and debt: WACC = w * + * . All of the 282 variables in this fomula will vary based on the project risks, and it is difficult to calculate total 283 costs of financing for a project early in the planning process. However, the revenue risk support 284 mechanisms described above can be used to decrease the cost of financing a project primarily by 285 increasing the leverage a project can take. This is a key assumption of the proposed model, in 286 using increased borrowing capacity as a proxy for reducing the financing costs of a project. 287
In practice, lenders calculate a project's borrowing capacity based on annual cash flows available 288 for debt service (CFADS) over the loan life, and required coverage ratios such as DSCR (debt 289 service coverage ratio), and LLCR (loan life coverage ratio). CFADS is the amount of cash 290 available to service debt after all essential operating expenses have been met (see Equation 1 ). 291 DSCR is defined as annual CFADS divided by the annual debt service. LLCR is equal to the 292 present value of CFADS ( ) over the loan life to the outstanding debt. Since annual 293 debt service and DSCR can be adjusted through structuring debt repayment schedules, the model 294 uses LLCR to determine the project's borrowing capacity at financial close (see Equation 2). 295
CFADS and LLCR will vary with project economics, credit enhancement mechanisms (including 296 fiscal support), and the seniority of the lien. A key driver for projects with revenue risks, of course, 297 is the lenders' evaluation of the traffic demand study for the project. Lenders and underwriters 298 generally use a very conservative probability of demand to determine CFADS, say 10% or even 5% 299 of the probability distribution. LLCRs also vary widely based on whether the project is exposed to 300 revenue risk. The required LLCR for CFADS with guaranteed revenue is generally between 301 1.2-1.3; while the market LLCR for CFADS with demand risk is generally between 1.5-1.9 (Khan 302
Government risk exposure 306
Fiscal supports dealing with project revenue risk may create contingent liabilities and claims for 307 the government, which increases the challenge of public budgeting. In order to better meet overall 308 fiscal constraints, a stochastic analysis is needed not only of the expected value, but also of the 309 volatility of the government's financial exposure (Kim and Ryan 2015) . A fiscal support with 310 lower expected value of government expenditure doesn't necessarily dominate one with a higher 311 expected value, if the volatility of the former is larger than the volatility of the latter. The concept 312 of value at risk (VaR) was first introduced to improve risk management in finance and insurance 313 (Embrechts, Klüppelberg et al. 2013 ). VaR takes volatility into account and stands for a threshold 314 loss value given a probability level (say P5, P10). VaR offers a better understanding of 315 government liabilities in extreme cases and a more informed decision can be achieved, especially 316 when a project's traffic forecast has an optimistic bias. Therefore, VaR is adopted as the dominant 317 indicator for government financial exposure, while expected value is used as a secondary indicator. 318
The VaR and expected value of the present value of government cash flow (CFg) can be calculated 319 through stochastic modeling and Monte Carlo simulation (see the next section "stochastic 320 modeling" for more details). 321
322
These two variables can not only be used to measure government financial exposure from an 323 individual project, but could also be combined with those variables from other projects to generate 324 portfolio level measures of risk, thus improving overall, long term budgeting and deficit control. 325
Value at Risk -Borrowing Capacity comparison framework 326
To facilitate comparison, here the indicators are integrated into a two-dimensional coordinate (see 327 Figure 2 ). The borrowing capacity is on the Y-axis, illustrating the leverage or marginal benefit of 328 government fiscal support. Value at risk (VaR) of government expenditure is on the X-axis, 329
illustrating the maximum potential cost of fiscal support given a certain probability level, e.g.: 5%.
Government Financial Exposure at Risk (5%) Revenue Study. Generally, concessionaires develop their own, internal studies of potential traffic, 375 but at financial close a final traffic study is developed and often publically released by the 376 procuring agency, with lenders or bond underwriters using a conservative probable outcome from 377 that study (or their own study) to size project debt if the concession is taking some revenue risk. 
Modeling borrowing capacity and public VaR under various supports 402
Three revenue risk sharing mechanisms are looked in this paper：(1) availability payment with 403 equal annual payment, (2) flexible term concession with LPVNR and maximum term limitation, 404 and (3) minimum revenue guarantee with excess revenue sharing. A base case is adopted as a 405 baseline for comparison. 406
Base case toll road without any credit enhancement 407
A base case without any credit enhancement is established in order to clarify the relative change 408 brought by government financial support. Generally, lenders will adopt both a conservative 409 probability for the forecast and a high debt coverage ratio to calculate a project's borrowing 410 capacity if there is no credit enhancement. is the construction period, and is the average loan life. is the market loan life 415 coverage ratio that lenders set for a project taking revenue risk. 416
In this case, the government has no financial exposure: 417
418
( ) is the present value of government cash inflow; a negative value denotes cash outflow. 419
Availability payment 420
Under an AP structure, the government retains all the revenue risk, and lenders will use the 421 amount of annual payment 
425
For the proposed model, it is assumed that the project is still toll funded but that those toll 426 revenues are collected by the government. Government cash flows consist of availability payment 427 cash outflows and toll revenue inflows. The model accounts for the fact that project toll revenue is 428 often not a completely independent variable, and is impacted by the owner of project revenue risk. 429
When all revenue risk is allocated to the government, toll revenue collected may be less than the 430 amount collected by a private concessionaire, due to incentive issues and varying public sector 431 objectives (e.g. affordability). Also, some toll revenue may be diverted to general funds rather than 
Flexible term concession with LPVNR and maximum term limitation 437
Flexible term procurements introduce an additional uncertainty from the perspective of project 438 lenders, in that when revenues are much higher than expected, the concession duration actually 439 shortens, thus exposing lenders to prepayment risk. This can be mitigated for projects with bank 440 loan financing in the terms of the loan, but nevertheless a flexible term procurement should not 441 reduce default risk for project lenders in a downside scenario. This mechanism usually does not 442 change the cash flow over the loan life, therefore it should not have significant influence on 443 borrowing capacity. 
Summary 474
The project borrowing capacity and present value of government cash flows incurred by each 475 fiscal support mechanisms are summarized in Table 1 . 476 
MRG with ERS
It should be noted that all of the inputs for this framework are based on information available to 478 the government, and are naturally uncertain due to the nature of early stage project planning, as 479 well as the information asymmetry among the involved parties. However, the comparison is still 480 helpful during early stage project planning in enabling the government to evaluate various support 481 mechanisms for sharing in revenue risk and for creating a procurement structure designed around 482 public priorities at the outset. 483
Numerical Case Study

484
A case study of a hypothetical toll funded highway concession is adopted to illustrate the 485 application of the proposed framework. The concession includes a two-year construction phase and 486 a 35-year operation phase. The basic project information is described in 
Structuring of fiscal support mechanisms 490
According to the formulas in Table 1 , the borrowing capacity for base case without any credit 491 enhancement is equal to For each fiscal support mechanism, governments may, for various reasons, need to first identify 497 appropriate structures that are able to increase the project's borrowing capacity and at the same time, 498 keep the project attractive to equity investors. For example, annual availability payments must 499 meet market requirements for ROEs. A trial-and-error method is taken to calculate the project's 500 borrowing capacities and the ROEs with varying levels of annual payment and find that the ROE 501 equals to 6.4%, 12.0%, 18.3%, 41.4% when the annual payment is 16.5 million, 16.75 million, 502 17.0 million and 17.5 million. Similarly, LPVNRs for flexible term contracts should be larger than 503 zero, and the expected project PVNR without any credit enhancement is taken as the value of 504 LPVNR in the analysis to facilitate comparison. Under MRG, it is assumed that the revenue 505 support and excess revenue sharing thresholds "mirror" the expected revenue projected, as is 506 common in MRG procurements (Vassallo and Soliño 2006) . In other words, if the lower threshold 507 is θ% of the forecasted revenue, then the upper threshold is (2-θ%) of the forecasted revenue. It is 508 assumed that the MRG only covers the loan life, while the ERS covers the whole operation phase. 509
In order to increase the project borrowing capacity compared to the base case but not to exceed the 510 capital cost, θ% should lie in the range of 65%-88%. When θ% equals 65%, the ROE has an 511 expected value larger than 12%, but it has a probability of 19% to be lower than 5%, which is the 512 interest rate for debt financing. As θ% increases, the concessionaire is able to achieve a higher 513 return on investment. 514
Simulation results 515
As toll price limitations are set by the prevailing contract, the principal source of revenue 516 uncertainty is the traffic volume in the first and subsequent years, which can be simulated, based on 517 downside and upside ranges of initial traffic volume and traffic volatility σ.
3 Initial traffic range 518 AADT1_lowest and AADT1_highest are assumed to be ±30% of 25,000. Traffic volatility σ can be (1) 519 observed from historical traffic series (for existing roads), (2) estimated and computed from a 520
Monte Carlo simulation based on historical GDP data under the standard assumption that traffic 521 assumed that the revenue coefficient β is 1; in other words, the actual toll revenue collected is 525 independent of the owner of project revenue risk. Sensitivity analyses are also conducted on these 526 parameters to explore under what circumstances, which fiscal support mechanism would be the 527 most advantageous choice. 528 10,000 revenue streams are randomly generated that follow GBM, and the probability 529 mechanisms are calculated. The figures of expected value, 5% quantile of government 531 expenditures are listed in Table 3 , where negative values stand for expenditures while positive 532 value stands for incomes. 533 The simulation results are put into the "Borrowing Capacity-VaR" comparison coordinate space 535 (See Figure 6) , and some potential acceptable levels of risk for a procuring agency are added for 536 illustrative purposes. This demonstrates that the acceptable risk level for the procuring agency may 537 guide them in determining which fiscal support is best for a given project. The results illustrate 538 that (1) the flexible term contract is unable to increase project's borrowing capacity; (2) AP can 539 raise more debt financing than MRG with the same VaR of government expenditure; (3) however, 540
if the government has a tight budget constraint, AP may turn out to be unaffordable; and (4) MRG 541 is the better choice if flexibility in revenue risk allocation is preferred -MRG can be structured 542 with a low guaranteed level of revenue and a high upside threshold that gives the concessionaire a 543 chance to capture a large part of the excess revenue opportunity. 544 545 Figure 6 . Borrowing Capacity-5% VaR Comparison Framework advantageous choice than MRG for government when the volatility σ reduces, for example, 549 σ=0.05 (see Figure 7) ; vice versa, for example, when σ=0.15, MRG dominates AP (see Figure 8) . 550
The same results are generated when the possible range of AADT1 changes. However, when the 551 revenue uncertainty is very small, i.e. an extreme case where there is effectively no revenue 552 uncertainty, government supports in either the form of MRG or AP may be unnecessary since a 553 concession without any credit enhancement is attractive enough to lenders and equity investors. 554 555 an MRG with a downside threshold equals 65% of the forecasted revenue will offer equity 562 investors an ROE that has an expected value of 8.5%, with a probability of 28% to be lower than 563 5%, and a probability of 41% to be lower than 7%, which is very likely not attractive to equity 564 investors. When θ% increases to 85%, the expected value of ROE increases to 12% and the 565 probability that ROE falls below 5% decreases to 15%, which is similar to the ROE distribution 566 with a 65% MRG under the original project conditions. MRGs with thresholds higher than 85% 567 are dominated by feasible AP arrangements, see Figure 9 . 568 Based on the sensitivity analysis and discussions, it is observed that the mean value of return on 571 investment, and the extent of revenue uncertainty may influence the optimal choice among the 572 alternative revenue risk sharing mechanisms. More specifically, if a project has an attractive return 573 on investment (a high mean revenue projection relative to its capital costs) and the revenue 574 uncertainty is very small, then a concession without any fiscal support is the best choice. If a 575 project has a high level of projected revenue volatility, MRG is more applicable. Finally, if a 576 project has a low expected return on investment (or has no viable toll revenue sources), AP is the 577 best choice if the revenue uncertainty is not very large. 
581
Our model can also account for varying toll collection incentives created by these fiscal support 582 mechanisms. This accounts for the assumption that toll revenues collected may be lower under an 583 AP procurement, in which revenue risk is held by the government, than MRG or another structure 584 in which some or all of it is allocated to the concessionaire. These are accounted for by using a β 585 coefficient less than 1 in calculating the retained risk under an AP structure. For example, if β 586 equals to 0.8, AP will be dominated by MRG, see Figure 11 . 587 The proposed model as designed does shed light on the applicability of one support mechanism in 597 particular -the flexible term concession. As described above, under the model the flexible term 598 procurement does little to increase project leverage, and hence reduce the cost of financing. While 599 the mechanism may reduce financing costs by increasing competition under particular global 600 infrastructure market conditions, it is unlikely that this particular support mechanism will be 601 effective in a developed, federal procurement market like the United States. 602
From the numerical case study, conclusions can be drawn regarding the applicability of two 603 additional support mechanisms (MRG/ERS and AP) based on project circumstances. Specifically, 604 it is found that MRG/ERS support mechanisms to be more flexible in sharing revenue risk 605 between a public sponsor and the private concessionaire for projects with a higher expected return 606 but significant volatility. AP is more applicable to projects that are projected to have a lower mean 607 revenue relative to their capital investment and lower volatility (or, of course, that will have no toll 608 revenue sources). 609
While this model is designed for an individual project, the outcomes (regarding the expected value 610 and volatility of government expenditure) from this framework can contribute to a more 611 comprehensive approach to fiscal portfolio management, and can thus improve fiscal deficit risk 612 management. The framework is also useful as a way to clarify and organize concepts qualitatively 613 in order to consider the value and cost of alternative fiscal supports for governments to share 614 revenue risk with PPP concessionaires. Future publications planned under this research initiative 615 include applying the proposed model to other revenue risk sharing mechanisms in practice, such as 616 limited credit enhancement supports. 617
It should be noted that, for federal procurement markets like the United States, this model does not 618 address federal support mechanisms to mitigate revenue risk, such as the Transportationagency procuring the asset or the concessionaire, and how those procuring governments evaluate 623 mechanisms for sharing that risk with concessionaires. It goes without saying that project sponsors 624 should pursue federal or other support programs to mitigate revenue risk for a given project 625 whenever these are available. 626
Structuring and optimizing each form of fiscal support, as well as improving the accuracy of the 627 inputs, are beyond the scope of this research. Although some relevant literature exists, these topics 628 remain a promising research opportunity. Also the framework suggested in this paper only 629 accounts for the cost of financing and public VaR in evaluating support mechanisms. There are 630 many other factors that can and should influence the allocation of revenue risk for a project. These 631 include market conditions that require one mechanism or another to generate enhanced levels of 632 competition for a procurement, which is less easily measurable. Social welfare priorities may also 633 be a relevant factor. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the allocation of revenue risk also 634 drives incentives for bidding concessionaires to design, build, and operate a project to maximize 635 traffic demand to mitigate that risk. This is a critical factor that cannot be accounted for in the 636 quantitative evaluation framework. Deep-dive, empirical research on a set of operating toll road 637 concessions with different revenue risk sharing mechanisms is needed to assess the strength of this 638
effect. 639
Finally, as Kim and Ryan (2015) asserted, it is important to stress the importance of developing 640 precise analytical tools for evaluating fiscal supports to PPPs. Fiscal supports are a good way to 641 leverage private investment, but using them requires a clear understanding of the problems and 642 risks retained by the public. As is often the case, the devil is in the details. Adding an explicit 643 marginal benefit/risk analysis of alternative mechanisms to allocate or share revenue risk is a step 644 in the right direction in developing a project portfolio that includes both PPPs and traditionally 645 procured assets. 646
